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Abstract
This paper investigates the theory of robustness against adversarial attacks. It
focuses on the family of randomization techniques that consist in injecting noise
in the network at inference time. These techniques have proven effective in many
contexts, but lack theoretical arguments. We close this gap by presenting a theo-
retical analysis of these approaches, hence explaining why they perform well in
practice. More precisely, we make two new contributions. The first one relates
the randomization rate to robustness to adversarial attacks. This result applies for
the general family of exponential distributions, and thus extends and unifies the
previous approaches. The second contribution consists in devising a new upper
bound on the adversarial generalization gap of randomized neural networks. We
support our theoretical claims with a set of experiments.
1 Introduction
Adversarial attacks are some of the most puzzling and burning issues in modern machine learning.
An adversarial attack refers to a small, imperceptible change of an input maliciously designed to fool
the result of a machine learning algorithm. Since the seminal work of [46] exhibiting this intriguing
phenomenon in the context of deep learning, a wealth of results have been published on designing
attacks [21, 37, 36, 27, 7, 35] and defenses [21, 38, 23, 33, 42, 31]), or on trying to understand the
very nature of this phenomenon [18, 43, 16, 17]. Most methods remain unsuccessful to defend against
powerful adversaries [7, 32, 2]. Among the defense strategies, randomization has proven effective
in some contexts. It consists in injecting random noise (both during training and inference phases)
inside the network architecture, i.e. at a given layer of the network. Noise can be drawn either from
Gaussian [30, 28, 40], Laplace [28], Uniform [49], or Multinomial [13] distributions. Remarkably,
most of the considered distributions belong to the Exponential family. Albeit these significant efforts,
several theoretical questions remain unanswered. Among these, we tackle the following, for which
we provide principled and theoretically-founded answers:
Q1: To what extent does a noise drawn from the Exponential family preserve robustness
(in a sense to be defined) to adversarial attacks?
A1: We introduce a definition of robustness to adversarial attacks that is suitable to the randomization
defense mechanism. As this mechanism can be described as a non-deterministic querying process,
called probabilistic mapping in the sequel, we propose a formal definition of robustness relying on a
metric/divergence between probability measures. A key question arises then about the appropriate
metric/divergence for our context. This requires tools for comparing divergences w.r.t. the introduced
robustness definition. Renyi divergence turned out to be a measure of choice, since it satisfies most
of the desired properties (coherence, strength, and computational tractability). Finally, thanks to
the existing links between the Renyi divergence and the Exponential family, we were able to prove
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that methods based on noise injection from the Exponential family ensures robustness to adversarial
examples (cf Theorem 1) .
Q2: Can we guarantee a good accuracy under attack for classifiers defended with this
kind of noise?
A2: We present an upper bound on the drop of accuracy (under attack) of the methods defended with
noise drawn from the Exponential family (cf. Theorem 2). Then, we illustrate this result by training
different randomized models with Laplace and Gaussian distributions on CIFAR10/CIFAR100. These
experiments highlight the trade-off between accuracy and robustness that depends on the amount of
noise one injects in the network. Our theoretical and experimental conclusion is that randomized
defenses are competitive (with the current state-of-the-art [32]) given the intensity of noise injected
in the network.
Outline of the paper: We present in Section 2 the related work on randomized defenses to adversarial
examples. Section 3 introduces the definition of robustness relying on a metric/divergence between
probability measures, and discusses the key role of the Renyi divergence. We state in Section 4 our
main results on the robustness and accuracy of Exponential family-based defenses. Section 5 presents
extensive experiments supporting our theoretical findings. Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
2 Related works
Injecting noise into algorithms to improve their robustness has been used for ages in detection and
signal processing tasks [51, 8, 34]. It has also been extensively studied in several machine learning
and optimization fields, e.g. robust optimization [5] and data augmentation techniques [39]. Recently,
noise injection techniques have been adopted by the adversarial defense community, especially for
neural networks, with very promising results. Randomization techniques are generally oriented
towards one of the following objectives: experimental robustness or provable robustness.
Experimental robustness: The first technique explicitly using randomization at inference time as a
defense appeared during the 2017 NIPS defense challenge [49]. This method uniformly samples over
geometric transformations of the image to select a substitute image to feed the network. Then [13]
proposed to use stochastic activation pruning based on a multinomial distribution for adversarial
defense. Several papers [30, 40] propose to inject Gaussian noise directly on the activation of selected
layers both at training and inference time. While these works hypothesize that noise injection makes
the network robust to adversarial perturbations, they do not provide any formal justification on the
nature of the noise they use or on the loss of accuracy/robustness of the network.
Provable robustness: In [28], the authors proposed a randomization method by exploiting the link
between differential privacy [15] and adversarial robustness. Their framework, called “randomized
smoothing” 1, inherits some theoretical results from the differential privacy community allowing
them to evaluate the level of accuracy under attack of their method. Initial results from [28] have been
refined in [29], and [10]. Our work belongs to this line of research. However, our framework does
not treat exactly the same class of defenses. Notably, we provide theoretical arguments supporting
the defense strategy based on randomization techniques relying on the exponential family, and derive
a new bound on the adversarial generalization gap, which completes the results obtained so far
on certified robustness. Furthermore, our focus is on the network randomized by noise injection,
“randomized smoothing” instead uses this network to create a new classifier robust to attacks.
Since the initial discovery of adversarial examples, a wealth of non randomized defense approaches
have also been proposed, inspired by various machine learning domains such as adversarial train-
ing [21, 31], image reconstruction [33, 42] or robust learning [21, 31]. Even if these methods have
their own merits, a thorough evaluation made by [2] shows that most defenses can be easily broken
with known powerful attacks [31, 7, 9]. Adversarial training, which consists in training a model
directly on adversarial examples, came out as the best defense in average. Defense based on ran-
domization could be overcome by the Expectation Over Transformation technique proposed by [3]
which consists in taking the expectation over the network to craft the perturbation. In this paper, to
ensure that our results are not biased by obfuscated gradients, we follow the principles of [2, 6] and
evaluate our randomized networks with this technique. We show that randomized defenses are still
competitive given the intensity of noise injected in the network.
1Name introduced in [10] which came later than [28].
2
3 General definitions of risk and robustness
3.1 Risk, robustness and probabilistic mappings
Let us consider two spaces X (with norm ‖.‖X ), and Y . We consider the classification task that seeks
a hypothesis (classifier) h : X → Y minimizing the risk of h w.r.t. some ground-truth distribution D
over X × Y . The risk of h w.r.t D is defined as
Risk(h) := E(x,y)∼D [1 (h(x) 6= y)] .
Given a classifier h : X → Y , and some input x ∈ X with true label ytrue ∈ Y , to generate an
adversarial example, the adversary seeks a τ such that h(x+ τ) 6= ytrue, with some budget α over
the perturbation (i.e with ‖τ‖X ≤ α). α represents the maximum amount of perturbation one can
add to x without being spotted (the perturbation remains humanly imperceptible). The overall goal of
the adversary is to find a perturbation crafting strategy that both maximizes the risk of h, and keeps
the values of ‖τ‖X small. To measure this risk "under attack" we define the notion of adversarial
α-radius risk of h w.r.t. D as follows
Riskα(h) := E(x,y)∼D
[
sup
‖τ‖X≤α
1 (h(x+ τ) 6= y)
]
.
In practice, the adversary does not have any access to the ground-truth distribution. The literature
proposed several surrogate versions of Riskα(h) (see [14] for more details) to overcome this issue.
We focus our analysis on the one used in e.g [46], or [16] denoted α-radius prediction-change risk of
h w.r.t. DX (marginal of D for X ), and defined as
PC-Riskα(h) := Px∼DX [∃τ ∈ B(α) s.t. h(x+ τ) 6= h(x)]
where for any α ≥ 0, B(α) := {τ ∈ X s.t. ‖τ‖X ≤ α} .
As we will inject some noise in our classifier in order to defend against adversarial attacks, we need
to introduce the notion of “probabilistic mapping”. Let Y be the output space, and FY a σ-algebra
over Y . Let us also denote P(Y) the set of probability measures over (Y,FY).
Definition 1 (Probabilistic mapping). Let X be an arbitrary space, and (Y,FY) a measurable space.
A probabilistic mapping from X to Y is a mapping M : X → P(Y). To obtain a numerical output
out of this probabilistic mapping, one needs to sample y according to M(x).
This definition does not depend on the nature of Y as long as (Y,FY) is measurable. In that sense, Y
could be either the label space or any intermediate space corresponding to the output of an arbitrary
hidden layer of a neural network. Moreover, any mapping can be considered as a probabilistic
mapping, whether it explicitly injects noise (as in [28, 40, 13]) or not. In fact, any deterministic
mapping can be considered as a probabilistic mapping, since it can be characterized by a Dirac
measure. Accordingly, the definition of a probabilistic mapping is fully general and equally treats
networks with or without noise injection. There exists no definition of robustness against adversarial
attacks that comply with the notion of probabilistic mappings. We settle that by generalizing the
notion of prediction-change risk initially introduced in [14] for deterministic classifiers. Let M be
a probabilistic mapping from X to Y , and dP(Y) some metric/divergence on P(Y). We define the
(α, )-radius prediction-change risk of M w.r.t. DX and dP(Y) as
PC-Riskα(M, ) := Px∼DX
[∃τ ∈ B(α) s.t. dP(Y)(M(x+ τ),M(x)) > ] .
These three generalized notions allow us to analyze noise injection defense mechanisms (Theorems 1,
and 2). We can also define adversarial robustness (and later adversarial gap) thanks to these notions.
Definition 2 (Adversarial robustness). Let dP(Y) be a metric/divergence on P(Y). The probabilistic
mapping M is said to be dP(Y)-(α, , γ) robust if PC-Riskα(M, ) ≤ γ.
It is difficult in general to show that a classifier is dP(Y)-(α, , γ) robust. However, we can derive
some bounds for particular divergences that will ensure robustness up to a certain level (Theorem 1).
It is worth noting that our definition of robustness depends on the considered metric/divergence
between probability measures. Lemma 1 gives some insights on the monotony of the robustness
according to the parameters, and the probability metric/divergence at hand.
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Lemma 1. Let M be a probabilistic mapping, and let d1 and d2 be two metrics on P(Y). If there
exists a non decreasing function φ : R→ R such that ∀µ1, µ2 ∈ P(Y), d1(µ1, µ2) ≤ φ(d2(µ1, µ2)),
then the following assertion holds:
M is d2-(α, , γ)-robust =⇒ M is d1-(α, φ(), γ)-robust
As suggested in Definition 2 and Lemma 1, any given choice of metric/divergence will instantiate a
particular notion of adversarial robustness and it should be carefully selected.
3.2 On the choice of the metric/divergence for robustness
The aforementioned formulation naturally raises the question of the choice of the metric used to
defend against adversarial attacks. The main notions that govern the selection of an appropriate
metric/divergence are coherence, strength, and computational tractability. A metric/divergence is
said to be coherent if it naturally fits the task at hand (e.g. classification tasks are intrinsically linked to
discrete/trivial metrics, conversely to regression tasks). The strength of a metric/divergence refers to
its ability to cover (dominate) a wide class of others in the sense of Lemma 1. In the following, we will
focus on both the total variation metric and the Renyi divergence, that we consider as respectively the
most coherent with the classification task using probabilistic mappings, and the strongest divergence.
We first discuss how total variation metric is coherent with randomized classifiers but suffers from
computational issues. Hopefully, the Renyi divergence provides good guarantees about adversarial
robustness, enjoys nice computational properties, in particular when considering Exponential family
distributions, and is strong enough to dominate a wide range of metrics/divergences including total
variation.
Let µ1 and µ2 be two measures in P(Y), both dominated by a third measure ν. The trivial distance
dT (µ1, µ2) := 1 (µ1 6= µ2) is the simplest distance one can define between µ1 and µ2. In the
deterministic case, it is straightforward to compute (since the numerical output of the algorithm
characterizes its associated measure), but this is not the case in general. In fact one might not
have access to the true distribution of the mapping, but just to the numerical outputs. Therefore,
one needs to consider more sophisticated metrics/divergences, such as the total variation distance
dTV (µ1, µ2) := supY ∈FY |µ1(Y )− µ2(Y )|. The total variation distance is one of the most broadly
used probability metrics. It admits several very simple interpretations, and is a very useful tool in
many mathematical fields such as probability theory, Bayesian statistics, coupling or transportation
theory. In transportation theory, it can be rewritten as the solution of the Monge-Kantorovich problem
with the cost function c(y1, y2) = 1 (y1 6= y2): inf
∫
Y2 1 (y1 6= y2) dpi(y1, y2) , where the infimum
is taken over all joint probability measures pi on (Y × Y,FY ⊗ FY) with marginals µ1 and µ2.
According to this interpretation, it seems quite natural to consider the total variation distance as a
relaxation of the trivial distance on [0, 1] (see [48] for details). In the deterministic case, the total
variation and the trivial distance coincides. In general, the total variation allows a finer analysis of the
probabilistic mappings than the trivial distance. But it suffers from a high computational complexity.
In the following of the paper we will show how to ensure robustness regarding TV distance.
Finally, denoting by g1 and g2 the respective probability distributions w.r.t. ν, the Renyi divergence of
order λ [41] writes as dR,λ(µ1, µ2) := 1λ−1 log
∫
Y g2(y)
(
g1(y)
g2(y)
)λ
dν(y). The Renyi divergence is a
generalized measure defined on the interval (1,∞), where it equals the Kullback-Leibler divergence
when λ→ 1 (that will be denoted dKL), and the maximum divergence when λ→∞. It also has the
very special property of being non decreasing w.r.t. λ. This divergence is very common in machine
learning, especially in its Kullback-Leibler form as it is widely used as the loss function (cross
entropy) of classification algorithms. It enjoys the desired properties since it bounds the TV distance,
and is tractable. Furthermore, Proposition 1 proves that Renyi-robustness implies TV-robustness,
making it a suitable surrogate for the trivial distance.
Proposition 1 (Renyi-robustness implies TV-robustness). Let M be a probabilistic mapping, then
∀λ ≥ 1:
M is dR,λ-(α, , γ)-robust =⇒ M is dTV -(α, ′, γ)-robust
with ′ = min
3
2
(√
1 +
4
9
− 1
)1/2
,
exp(+ 1)− 1
exp(+ 1) + 1
 .
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A crucial property of Renyi-robustness is the Data processing inequality. It is a well-known inequality
from information theory which states that “post-processing cannot increase information” [11, 4].
In our case, if we consider a Renyi-robust probabilistic mapping, composing it with a deterministic
mapping maintains Renyi-robustness with the same level.
Proposition 2 (Data processing inequality). Let us consider a probabilistic mapping M : X → P(Y).
Let us also denote ρ : Y → Y ′ a deterministic function. If U ∼ M(x) then the probability measure
M ′(x) s.t ρ(U) ∼M ′(x) defines a probabilistic mapping M ′ : X → P(Y ′).
For any λ > 1 if M is dR,λ-(α, , γ) robust then M ′ is also is dR,λ-(α, , γ) robust.
Data processing inequality will allow us later to inject some additive noise in any layer of a neural
network and to ensure Renyi-robustness.
4 Defense mechanisms based on Exponential family noise injection
4.1 Robustness through Exponential family noise injection
For now, the question of which class of noise to add is treated ad hoc. We choose here to investigate
one particular class of noise closely linked to the Renyi divergence, namely Exponential family
distributions, and demonstrate their interest. Let us first recall what the Exponential family is.
Definition 3 (Exponential family). Let Θ be an open convex set of Rn, and θ ∈ Θ. Let ν be a
measure dominated by µ (either by the Lebesgue or counting measure), it is said to be part of the
Exponential family of parameter θ (denoted EF (θ, t, k)) if it has the following probability density
function
pF (z, θ) = exp {〈t(z), θ〉 − u(θ) + k(z)}
where t(z) is a sufficient statistic, k a carrier measure (either for a Lebesgue or a counting measure)
and u(θ) = log
∫
z
exp {< t(z), θ > +k(z)} dz.
To show the robustness of randomized networks with noise injected from the Exponential family, one
needs to define the notion of sensitivity for a given deterministic function:
Definition 4 (Sensitivity of a function). For any α ≥ 0 and for any ||.||A and ||.||B two norms, the
α-sensitivity of f w.r.t. ||.||A and ||.||B is defined as
∆A,Bα (f) := sup
x,y∈X ,||x−y||A≤α
||f(x)− f(y)||B .
Let us consider an n-layer feedforward neural network N (.) = φn ◦ ... ◦ φ1(.). For any i ∈ [n],
we define N|i(.) = φi ◦ ... ◦ φ1(.) the neural network truncated at layer i. Theorem 1 shows that,
injecting noise drawn from an Exponential family distribution ensures robustness to adversarial
example attacks in the sense of Definition 2.
Theorem 1 (Exponential family ensures robustness). Let us denoteN iX(.) = φn ◦ ... ◦φi+1(N|i(.) +
X) with X a random variable. Let us also consider two arbitrary norms ||.||A and ||.||B respectively
on X and on the output space of N iX .
• If X ∼ EF (θ, t, k) where t and k have non-decreasing modulus of continuity ωt and ωk.
Then for any α ≥ 0, N iX(.) defines a probabilistic mapping that is dR,λ-(α, ) robust with
 = ||θ||2ωB,2t (∆A,Bα (φ)) + ωB,1k (∆A,Bα (φ)) where ||.||2 is the norm corresponding to the
scalar product in the definition of the exponential family density function and ||.||1 is the
absolute value on R. The notion of continuity modulus is defined in the supplementary
material.
• If X is a centered Gaussian random variable with a non degenerated matrix parameter Σ.
Then for any α ≥ 0, N iX(.) defines a probabilistic mapping that is dR,λ-(α, ) robust with
 =
λ∆A,2α (φ)
2
2σmin(Σ)
where ||.||2 is the canonical Euclidean norm on Rn.
In simpler words, the previous theorem ensures stability in the neural network when injecting noise
w.r.t. the distribution of the output. Intuitively, if two inputs are close w.r.t. ‖.‖A, the output
distributions of the network will be close in the sense of Renyi divergence. It is well known that
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in the case of deterministic neural networks, the Lipschitz constant becomes bigger as the number
of layers increases [22]. By injecting noise at layer i, the notion of robustness only depends on the
sensitivity of the first i layers of the network and not the following ones. In that sense, randomization
provides a more precise control on the “continuity” of the neural network. In the next section, we
show that thanks to the notion of robustness w.r.t. probabilistic mappings, one can bound the loss of
accuracy of a randomized neural network when it is attacked.
4.2 Bound on the generalization gap under attack
The notions of risk and adversarial risk can easily be generalized to encompass probabilistic mappings.
Definition 5 (Risks for probabilistic mappings). Let M be a probabilistic mapping from X to Y , the
risk and the α-radius adversarial risk of M w.r.t. D are defined as
Risk(M) := E(x,y)∼D
[
Ey′∼M(x) [1 (y′ 6= y)]
]
Riskα(M) := E(x,y)∼D
[
sup
‖τ‖X≤α
Ey′∼M(x+τ) [1 (y′ 6= y)]
]
.
The definition of adversarial risk for a probabilistic mapping can be matched with the concept of
Expectation over Transformation (EoT) attacks [2]. Indeed, EoT attacks aim at computing the best
opponent in expectation for a given random transformation. In the adversarial risk definition, the
adversary chooses the perturbation which has the greatest probability to fool the model, which is
a stronger objective than the EoT objective. Theorem 2 provides a bound on the gap between the
adversarial risk and the regular risk:
Theorem 2 (Adversarial generalization gap bound in the randomized setting). Let M be the proba-
bilistic mapping at hand. Let us suppose that M is dR,λ-(α, ) robust for some λ ≥ 1 then:
|Riskα(M)− Risk(M)| ≤ 1− e−Ex
[
e−H(M(x))
]
where H is the Shannon entropy H(p) = −∑i pi log(pi) .
This theorem gives a control on the loss of accuracy under attack w.r.t. the robustness parameter 
and the entropy of the predictor. It provides a tradeoff between the quantity of noise added in the
network and the accuracy under attack. Intuitively, when the noise increases, for any input, the output
distribution tends towards the uniform distribution, then, → 0 and H(M(x))→ log(K), and the
risk and the adversarial risk both tends to 1K where K is the number of classes in the classification
problem. On the opposite, if no noise is injected, for any input, the output distribution is a Dirac
distribution, then, if the prediction for the adversarial example is not the same as for the regular one,
 → ∞ and H(M(x)) → 0. Hence, the noise needs to be designed both to preserve accuracy and
robustness to adversarial attacks. In the Section 5, we give an illustration of this bound when M is a
neural network with noise injection at input level as presented in Theorem 1.
5 Numerical experiments
To illustrate our theoretical findings, we train randomized neural networks with a simple method
which consists in injecting a noise drawn from an Exponential family distribution in the image during
training and inference. This section aims to answer Q2 stated in the introduction, by tackling the
following sub-questions:
Q2.1: How does the randomization impact the accuracy of the network? And, how does the
theoretical trade-off between accuracy and robustness apply in practice?
Q2.2: What is the accuracy under attack of randomized neural networks against powerful iterative
attacks? And how does randomized neural networks compare to state-of-the-art defenses
given the intensity of the injected noise?
5.1 Experimental setup
We present our results and analysis on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 [26] and ImageNet datasets [12]. For
CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 [26], we used a Wide ResNet architecture [50] which is a variant of the
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Figure 1: (a) Impact of the standard deviation of the injected noise on accuracy in a randomized model
on CIFAR-10 dataset with a Wide ResNet architecture. (b) and (c) illustration of the guaranteed
accuracy of different randomized models with Gaussian (b) and Laplace (c) noises given the norm of
the adversarial perturbation.
ResNet model from [24]. We use 28 layers with a widen factor of 10. We train all networks for
200 epochs, a batch size of 400, dropout 0.3 and Leaky Relu activation with a slope on R− of 0.1.
We minimize the Cross Entropy Loss with Momentum 0.9 and use a piecewise constant learning
rate of 0.1, 0.02, 0.004 and 0.00008 after respectively 7500, 15000 and 20000 steps. The networks
achieve for CIFAR10 and 100 a TOP-1 accuracy of 95.8% and 79.1% respectively on test images.
For ImageNet [12], we use an Inception ResNet v2 [45] which is the sate of the art architecture for
this dataset and achieve a TOP-1 accuracy of 80%. For the training of ImageNet, we use the same
hyper parameters setting as the original implementation. We train the network for 120 epochs with
a batch size of 256, dropout 0.8 and Relu as activation function. All evaluations were done with a
single crop on the non-blacklisted subset of the validation set.
To transform these classical networks to probabilistic mappings, we inject noise drawn from Laplace
and Gaussian distributions, each with various standard deviations. While the noise could theoretically
be injected anywhere in the network, we inject the noise on the image for simplicity. More experiments
with noise injected in the first layer of the network are presented in the supplementary material.
To evaluate our models under attack, we use three powerful iterative attacks with different norms:
ElasticNet attack (EAD) [9] with `1 distortion, Carlini&Wagner attack (C&W) [7] with `2 distortion
and Projected Gradient Descent attack (PGD) [31] with `∞ distortion. All standard deviations and
attack intensities are in between −1 and 1. Precise descriptions of our numerical experiments and of
the attacks used for evaluation are deferred to the supplementary material.
Attacks against randomized defenses: It has been pointed out by [3, 6] that in a white box setting,
an attacker with a complete knowledge of the system will know the distribution of the noise injected
in the network. As such, to create a stronger adversarial example, the attacker can take the expectation
of the loss or the logits of the randomized network during the computation of the attack. This
technique is called Expectation Over Transformation (EoT) and we use a Monte Carlo method with
80 simulations to approximate the best perturbation for a randomized network.
5.2 Experimental results
Trade-off between accuracy and intensity of noise (Q2.1): When injecting noise as a defense
mechanism, regardless of the distribution it is drawn from, we observe (as in Figure 1(a)) that the
accuracy decreases when the noise intensity grows. In that sense, noise needs to be calibrated to
preserve both accuracy and robustness against adversarial attacks, i.e. it needs to be large enough to
preserve robustness and small enough to preserve accuracy. Figure 1(a) shows the loss of accuracy on
CIFAR10 from 0.95 to 0.82 (respectively 0.95 to 0.84) with noise drawn from a Gaussian distribution
(respectively Laplace) with a standard deviation from 0.01 to 0.5. Figure 1(b) and 1(c) illustrate the
theoretical lower bound on accuracy under attack of Theorem 2 for different distributions and standard
deviations. The term in entropy of Theorem 2 has been estimated using a Monte Carlo method with
104 simulations. The trade-off between accuracy and robustness from Theorem 2 thus appears w.r.t
the noise intensity. With small noises, the accuracy is high, but the guaranteed accuracy drops fast
w.r.t the magnitude of the adversarial perturbation. Conversely, with bigger noises, the accuracy is
lower but decreases slowly w.r.t the magnitude of the adversarial perturbation. These Figures also
show that Theorem 2 gives strong accuracy guarantees against small adversarial perturbations. Next
7
Table 1: Accuracy under attack on the CIFAR-10 dataset with a randomized Wide ResNet architecture.
We compare the accuracy on natural images and under attack with different noise over 3 iterative
attacks (the number of steps is next to the name) made with 80 Monte Carlo simulations to compute
EoT attacks. The first line is the baseline, no noise has been injected.
Distribution Sd Natural `1 – EAD 60 `2 – C&W 60 `∞ – PGD 20
- - 0.958 0.035 0.034 0.384
Normal 0.01 0.954 0.193 0.294 0.4080.50 0.824 0.448 0.523 0.587
Laplace 0.01 0.955 0.208 0.313 0.3890.50 0.846 0.464 0.494 0.589
Table 2: Accuracy under attack of randomized neural network with different distributions and
standard deviations versus adversarial training by Madry et al. [31]. The PGD attack has been made
with 20 step, an epsilon of 0.06 and a step size of 0.006 (input space between −1 and +1). The
Carlini&Wagner attack uses 30 steps, 9 binary search steps and a 0.01 learning rate. The first line
refers to the baseline without attack.
Madry et al.
[31]
Normal 0.32 Laplace 0.32 Normal 0.5 Laplace 0.5Attack Steps
- - 0.873 0.876 0.891 0.824 0.846
`∞ – PGD 20 0.456 0.566 0.576 0.587 0.589
`2 – C&W 30 0.468 0.512 0.502 0.489 0.479
paragraph shows that in practice, randomized networks achieve much higher accuracy under attack
than the theoretical bound, and keep this accuracy against much larger perturbations.
Performance of randomized networks under attacks and comparison to state of the art (Q2.2):
While Figure 1(b) and 1(c) illustrated a theoretical robustness against growing adversarial pertur-
bations, Table 1 illustrates this trade-off experimentally. It compares the accuracy obtained under
attack by a deterministic network with the one obtained by randomized networks with Gaussian and
Laplace noises both with low (0.01) and high (0.5) standard deviations. Randomized networks with a
small noise lead to no loss in accuracy with a small robustness while high noise leads to a higher
robustness at the expense of loss of accuracy (∼ 11 points).
Finally, Table 2 compares the accuracy and the accuracy under attack of randomized networks with
Gaussian and Laplace distributions for different standard deviations against adversarial training from
Madry et al. [31]. We observe that the accuracy on natural images of both noise injection methods
are similar to the one from [31]. Moreover, both methods are more robust than adversarial training to
PGD and C&W attacks. As with all the experiments, to construct an EoT attack, we use 80 Monte
Carlo simulations at every step of PGD and C&W attacks. These experiments show that randomized
defenses can be competitive given the intensity of noise injected in the network. Note that these
experiments have been led with EoT of size 80. For much bigger sizes of EoT these results would
be mitigated. Nevertheless, the accuracy would never drop under the bounds illustrated in Figure 5.2,
since Theorem 2 gives a bound that on the worst case attack strategy (including EoT).
6 Conclusion and future works
This paper brings new contributions to the field of provable defenses to adversarial attacks. Principled
answers have been provided to key questions on the interest of randomization techniques, and on their
loss of accuracy under attack. The obtained bounds have been illustrated in practice by conducting
thorough experiments on baseline datasets such as CIFAR and ImageNet. We show in particular that a
simple method based on injecting noise drawn from the Exponential family is competitive compared
to baseline approaches while leading to provable guarantees. Future work will focus on investigating
other noise distributions belonging or not to the Exponential family, combining randomization with
more sophisticated defenses and on devising new tight bounds on the adversarial generalization gap.
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A Notations and definitions
Let us consider an output space Y , and FY a σ-algebra over Y . We denote P(Y) the set of probability measures
over (Y,FY). Let (Y ′,FY′) be a second measurable space, and φ a measurable mapping from (Y,FY) to (Y ′,FY′).
Finally Let us consider µ, ν two measures on (Y,FY).
Dominated measure: µ is said to be dominated by ν (denoted µ ν) if for all Y ∈ FY , ν(Y ) = 0 =⇒ µ(Y ) = 0.
If µ is dominated by ν, there is a measurable function h : Y → [0,+∞) such that for all Y ∈ FY , µ(Y ) =
∫
Y
h dν. h
is called the Radon-Nikodym derivative of µ w.r.t. ν and is denoted dµdν .
Push-forward measure: the push-forward measure of ν by φ (denoted φ#ν) is the measure on (Y ′,FY′) such that
∀Z ∈ FY′ , φ#ν(Z) = ν(φ−1(Z)).
Convolution product: the convolution of ν with µ, denoted ν ∗µ is the push-forward measure of ν⊗µ by the addition
on Y . Since the convolution between functions is defined accordingly, we use ∗ indifferently for measures and simple
functions.
Modulus of continuity: Let us consider f : (E, ‖.‖E)→ (F, ‖.‖F ). f admits a non-decreasing modulus of continuity
regarding ‖.‖E and ‖.‖F if there exists a non-decreasing function ωE,Ff : R+ → R+ such as for all x, y ∈ E,
||f(y)− f(x)||F ≤ ωE,Ff (||x− y||E).
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B Main proofs
As a trade-off between completeness and conciseness, we delayed the proofs of our theorems to this section.
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1. Let M be a probabilistic mapping, and let d1 and d2 be two metrics on P(Y). If there exists a non
decreasing function φ : R→ R such that ∀µ1, µ2 ∈ P(Y), d1(µ1, µ2) ≤ φ(d2(µ1, µ2)), then the following holds:
M is d2-(α, , γ)-robust =⇒ M is d1-(α, φ(), γ)-robust
Proof. Let us consider a probabilistic mapping M, x ∼ D, and τ ∈ B(α), one has d1(M(x),M(x + τ)) ≤
φ(d2(M(x),M(x + τ))) ≤ φ(). Hence Px∼D [∀τ ∈ B(α), d1(M(x+ τ),M(x)) ≤ φ()] ≤ 1 − γ. By inverting
the inequality, one gets the expected result.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 (Renyi-robustness implies TV-robustness). Let M be a probabilistic mapping, then for all λ ≥ 1:
M is dR,λ-(α, , γ)-robust =⇒ M is dTV -(α, ′, γ)-robust
with ′ = min
3
2
(√
1 +
4
9
− 1
)1/2
,
exp(+ 1)− 1
exp(+ 1) + 1
 .
Proof. Given two probability measures µ1 and µ2 on (Y,FY), and λ > 0 one wants to find a bound on dTV (µ1, µ2)
as a functional of dR,λ(µ1, µ2).
Thanks to [20], one has
dKL(µ1, µ2) ≥ 2dTV (µ1, µ2)2 + 4dTV (µ1, µ2)
4
9
.
From which it follows that
dTV (µ1, µ2)
2 ≤ 9
4
(√
1 +
4dKL(µ1, µ2)
9
− 1
)
One thus finally gets:
dTV (µ1, µ2) ≤ 3
2
(√
1 +
4dKL(µ1, µ2)
9
− 1
)1/2
Moreover, using inequality from [47], one gets:
dKL(µ1, µ2) ≥ log
(
1 + dTV (µ1, µ2)
1− dTV (µ1, µ2)
)
− 2dTV (µ1, µ2)
1 + dTV (µ1, µ2)
For the sake of simplicity, since the second part of the right hand side of the equation is non increasing given
dTV (µ1, µ2), and since 0 ≤ dTV (µ1, µ2) ≤ 1 one gets:
dKL(µ1, µ2) + 1 ≥ log
(
1 + dTV (µ1, µ2)
1− dTV (µ1, µ2)
)
Hence, one gets:
exp(dKL(µ1, µ2) + 1)− 1
exp(dKL(µ1, µ2) + 1) + 1
≥ dTV (µ1, µ2)
By combining the two results, one obtains:
dTV (µ1, µ2) ≤ min
3
2
(√
1 +
4dKL(µ1, µ2)
9
− 1
)1/2
,
exp(dKL(µ1, µ2) + 1)− 1
exp(dKL(µ1, µ2) + 1) + 1
 .
To conclude for λ > 1 it suffices to use Lemma 1, and the monotony of Renyi divergence regarding λ.
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B.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2 (Data processing inequality). Let us consider a probabilistic mapping M : X → P(Y). Let us also
denote ρ : Y → Y ′ a deterministic function. If U ∼ M(x) then the probability measure M ′(x) s.t. ρ(U) ∼ M ′(x)
defines a probabilistic mapping M ′ : X → P(Y ′).
For any λ > 1 if M is dR,λ-(α, , γ) robust then M ′ is also is dR,λ-(α, , γ) robust.
Proof. Let us consider M a dR,λ-(α, , γ) robust algorithm. Let us also take x ∈ X , and τ ∈ B(α). Without loss
of generality, we consider that M(x), and M(x + τ) are dominated by the same measure µ. Finally let us take ρ a
measurable mapping from (Y,FY) to (Y ′,FY′). For the sake of readability we denote M(x) = ν1 and M(x+ τ) = ν2
(therefore M ′(x) = ρ#ν1, and M ′(x+ τ) = ρ#ν2).
Since µ >> ν1, ν2, one has ρ#µ >> ρ#ν1, ρ#ν2. Hence one has
dR,λ(ρ#ν1, ρ#ν2) =
1
λ− 1 log
∫
Y
(
dρ#ν1
dρ#µ
)λ(
dρ#ν2
dρ#µ
)1−λ
dρ#µ =
1
λ− 1 log
∫
Y
(
dρ#ν1
dρ#ν2
)λ
dρ#ν2
Simply using the transfer theorem, one gets
dR,λ(ρ#ν1, ρ#ν2) =
1
λ− 1 log
∫
Y′
(
dρ#ν1
dρ#ν2
◦ ρ
)λ
dν2
Since
(
dρ#ν1
dρ#ν2
◦ ρ
)
= E
(
dν1
dν2
∣∣ρ−1(FY)) one easily gets the following:
dR,λ(ρ#ν1, ρ#ν2) =
1
λ− 1 log
∫
Y′
(
dρ#ν1
dρ#ν2
◦ ρ
)λ
dν2 =
1
λ− 1 log
∫
Y′
E
(
dν1
dν2
∣∣ρ−1(FY))λ dν2
Finally, by using the Jensen inequality, and the property of the conditional expectation, one has
dR,λ(ρ#ν1, ρ#ν2) ≤ 1
λ− 1 log
∫
Y′
E
(
dν1
dν2
λ∣∣ρ−1(FY)) dν2 = 1
λ− 1 log
∫
Y′
dν1
dν2
λ
dν2 = dR,λ(ν1, ν2).
B.4 Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma 2. Let ψ : X → Rn be a mapping. For any α ≥ 0 and for any norms ||.||A and ||.||B , one can define
∆A,Bα (ψ) := sup
x,y∈X ,||x−y||A≤α
||ψ(x) − ψ(y)||B . Let X be a random variable. We denote M(x) the probability
measure of the random variable ψ(x) +X .
• If X ∼ EF (θ, t, k) where t and k have non-decreasing modulus of continuity ωt and ωk.
Then for any α ≥ 0, M defines a probabilistic mapping that is dR,λ-(α, ) robust with  = ||θ||2ωB,2t (∆A,Bα (φ)) +
ωB,1k (∆
A,B
α (φ)) where ||.||2 is the norm corresponding to the scalar product in the definition of the exponential
family density function and ||.||1 is here the absolute value on R.
• If X is a centered Gaussian random variable with a non degenerated matrix parameter Σ. Then for any α ≥ 0,
M defines a probabilistic mapping that is dR,λ-(α, ) robust with  =
λ∆A,2α (φ)
2
2σmin(Σ)
where ||.||2 is the canonical
Euclidean norm on Rn.
Proof. Let us consider M the probabilistic mapping constructed from noise injections respectively drawn from 1) an
exponential family with non-decreasing modulus of continuity, or 2) a non degenerate Gaussian. Let us take x ∈ X , and
τ ∈ B(α). Without loss of generality, we consider that M(x), and M(x+ τ) are dominated by the same measure µ. Let
us also denote, pF the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the noise drawn in 1) with respect to µ, pG the Radon-Nikodym
derivative of the noise drawn or in 2) with respect to µ and δa the Dirac function mapping any element to 1 if it equals
a and to 0 otherwise.
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1)
dR,λ (M(x),M(x+ τ)) = dR,λ
(
ν ∗ δψ(x), ν ∗ δψ(x+τ)
)
≤ dR,∞
(
ν ∗ δψ(x), ν ∗ δψ(x+τ)
)
= log sup
z∈Rn
(pF ∗ δψ(x))(z)
(pF ∗ δψ(x+τ))(z)
= log sup
z∈Rn
exp(< t(z − ψ(x))− t(z − ψ(x+ τ)), θ >
+ k(z − ψ(x))− k(z − ψ(x+ τ)))
≤ sup
z∈Rn
||θ||2||t(z − ψ(x))− t(z − ψ(x+ τ))||2 + |k(z − ψ(x))− k(z − ψ(x+ τ))|
≤ ||θ||2ωB,2t (||ψ(x+ τ)− ψ(x)||B) + ωB,1k (||ψ(x+ τ)− ψ(x)||B)
≤ ||θ||2ωB,2t (∆A,Bα (ψ)) + ωB,1k (∆A,Bα (ψ))
2)
dR,λ (M(x),M(x+ τ)) =
1
λ− 1 log
∫
Rn
(
pG ∗ δψ(x)
)λ × (pG ∗ δψ(x+τ))1−λ dµ
=
1
λ− 1 log
∫
Rn
exp
{
−1/2
(
λ (z − ψ(x))>Σ−1 (z − ψ(x)) + (1− λ) (z − ψ(x+ τ))> Σ−1 (z − ψ(x+ τ))
)}
(2pi)n/2|Σ|1/2 dz
=
−
(
λψ(x)>Σ−1ψ(x) + (1− λ)ψ(x+ τ)>Σ−1ψ(x+ τ)− (λψ(x) + (1− λ)ψ(x+ τ))> Σ−1 (λψ(x) + (1− λ)ψ(x+ τ))
)
2λ− 2
=
λ2 − λ
2(λ− 1)(ψ(x)− ψ(x+ τ))
>Σ−1(ψ(x)− ψ(x+ τ))
≤ λ
2
σmax
(
Σ−1
) ||(ψ(x)− ψ(x+ τ))||22 ≤ λ∆A,2α (ψ)22σmin(Σ) .
Theorem 1 (Exponential family ensures robustness). Let us denote N iX(.) = φn ◦ ... ◦ φi+1(N|i(.) +X) with X a
random variable. Let us also consider ||.||A, and ||.||B two arbitrary norms respectively on X and on the output space
of N iX .
• If X ∼ EF (θ, t, k) where t and k have non-decreasing modulus of continuity ωt and ωk. Then for any α ≥ 0,
N iX(.) defines a probabilistic mapping that is dR,λ-(α, ) robust with  = ||θ||2ωB,2t (∆A,Bα (φ))+ωB,1k (∆A,Bα (φ))
where ||.||2 is the norm corresponding to the scalar product in the definition of the exponential family density
function and ||.||1 is here the absolute value on R. The notion of continuity modulus is defined in the preamble of
this supplementary material.
• If X is a centered Gaussian2 random variable with a non degenerated matrix parameter Σ. Then for any α ≥ 0,
N iX(.) defines a probabilistic mapping that is dR,λ-(α, ) robust with  = λ∆
A,2
α (φ)
2
2σmin(Σ)
where ||.||2 is the canonical
Euclidean norm on Rn.
Proof. This theorem is a direct consequence of Lemma 2 and Proposition 2. By applying Lemma 2 to ψ = N|i and
Proposition 2 to ρ = φn ◦ ... ◦ φi+1, we immediately get the result.
B.5 Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2 (Adversarial generalization gap bound in the randomized setting). Let M be the probabilistic mapping at
hand. Let suppose that M is dR,λ-(α, ) robust for some λ ≥ 1 then:
2Although the Gaussian distribution belongs to the exponential family, it does not satisfy the modulus of
continuity constraint on t and its robustness has to be proved differently.
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|Riskα(M)− Risk(M)| ≤ 1− e−Ex
[
e−H(M(x))
]
where H is the Shannon entropy: H(p) = −∑i pi log(pi)
Proof. Let M be a randomized network with a noise X injected at layer i. We have:
|Riskα(M)− Risk(M)| =
∣∣∣∣∣E(x,y)
[
sup
τ/||τ ||≤α
Ey′∼M(x+τ) [1 (y1 6= y)]− Ey2∼M(x) [1 (y′ 6= y)]
]∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣E(x,y)
[
sup
τ/||τ ||≤α
Ey1∼M(x+τ),y2∼M(x) [1 (y1 6= y)− 1 (y2 6= y)]
]∣∣∣∣∣
≤ E(x,y)
[
sup
τ/||τ ||≤α
Ey1∼M(x+τ),y2∼M(x) [|1 (y1 6= y)− 1 (y2 6= y)|]
]
≤ E(x,y)
[
sup
τ/||τ ||≤α
Ey1∼M(x+τ),y2∼M(x) [1 (y1 6= y2)]
]
= E(x,y)
[
sup
τ/||τ ||≤α
Py1∼M(x+τ),y2∼M(x)(y1 6= y2)
]
For two discrete random independent variables of law P = (p1, ..., pK) and Q = (q1, ..., qK), thanks to Jensen’s
inequality:
P(P = Q) =
K∑
i=1
piqi ≥ exp (
K∑
i=1
pi log qi) = exp (−dKL(P,Q)−H(P ))
Then we have:
E(x,y)
[
sup
τ/||τ ||≤α
Py1∼M(x+τ),y2∼M(x)(y1 6= y2)
]
≤ E(x,y)
[
sup
τ/||τ ||≤α
1− e−dKL(M(x),M(x+τ))−H(M(x))
]
≤ E(x,y)
[
1− e−−H(M(x))
]
= 1− e−Ex
[
e−H(M(x))
]
C Additional results and discussions
In this section, we give some additional results on both the strength of the Renyi-divergence and a bound on the
generalization gap for TV-distance.
C.1 About Renyi divergence
In the main submission, we chose to use the Renyi-robustness as the principled measure of robustness. Since Renyi-
divergence is a good surrogate for the trivial distance (which is a generalization of the 0 − 1-loss for probabilistic
mappings), we supported this statement by showing that Renyi-divergence is stronger than TV-distance. In this section,
we extend this result to most of the classical divergences used in Machine Learning and show that Renyi-divergence is
stronger than all of them.
Let us consider an output space Y , FY a σ-algebra over Y , and µ1, µ2, ν three measures on (Y,FY), with µ1, µ2 in
the set of probability measures over (Y,FY) denoted P(Y). One has ν >> µ1, µ2 and one denotes g1 and g2 the
Radon-Nikodym derivatives with respect to ν.
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The Separation distance:
dS(µ1, µ2) := sup
{z}∈FY
1− µ1({z})
µ2({z}) .
The Hellinger distance:
dH(µ1, µ2) :=
[∫
Y
(
√
g1 −√g2)2 dν
]1/2
.
The Prokhorov metric:
dP (µ1, µ2) := inf
{
ζ > 0 : µ1(B) ≤ µ2(Bζ) + ζ for all Borel sets B
}
where Bζ = {x : inf
y∈B
dY′(x, y) ≤ ζ}.
The Discrepancy metric:
dD(µ1, µ2) := sup
all closed balls B
|µ1(B)− µ2(B)| .
Lemma 3. Given two probability measures µ1 and µ2 on (Y,FY) the Separation metric and the Renyi divergence
satisfy the following relation: dS(µ1, µ2) ≤ dR,∞(µ1, µ2)
Proof. The function x :→ 1−x−|ln(x)| is negative onR, therefore for any {z} ∈ Y one has 1− µ1({z})µ2({z}) ≤
∣∣∣ln µ1({z})µ2({z}) ∣∣∣,
hence sup{z}∈FY 1− µ1({z})µ2({z}) ≤ sup{z}∈FY
∣∣∣ln µ1({z})µ2({z}) ∣∣∣ ≤ supZ∈FY ∣∣∣ln µ1(Z)µ2(Z) ∣∣∣ = dR,∞(µ1, µ2)
Theorem 3. Let M be the probabilistic mapping, then for all λ > 1 if M is dR,λ-(α, , γ)-robust the following
assertions holds:
(1) M is dH -(α,
√
, γ)-robust.
(2) M is dP -(α, ′, γ)-robust and dD-(α, ′, γ)-robust, for ′ = min
(
3
2
(√
1 + 49 − 1
)1/2
, exp(+1)−1exp(+1)+1
)
.
(3) M is dW -(α, ′, γ)-robust with ′ = min
(
3
2diam(Y)
(√
1 + 49 − 1
)1/2
, exp(+1)−1diam(Y)(exp(+1)+1)
)
.
(4) if λ =∞, M is dS-(α, , γ)-robust.
Proof.
(1) The proof is a simple adaptation of Proposition 1 using the inequality dH(µ1, µ2)2 ≤ dKL(µ1, µ2) [19] and
Lemma 1.
(2) Using the inequalities dD(µ1, µ2) ≤ dTV (µ1, µ2) [19] and dP (µ1, µ2) ≤ dTV (µ1, µ2) [25], the proof is immedi-
ate, using Theorem 1 and Lemma 1.
(3) The proof is adapted from Proposition 1 using the inequality dW (µ1, µ2) ≤ diam(Y)dTV (µ1, µ2) [19].
(4) The result is a straightforward application of Lemma 3, and Lemma 1.
C.2 Generalization gap with TV-robustness
In the main paper, we give a bound on the generalization gap based on the Renyi-robustness. We extend this result to
the TV-robustness, highlighting the fact that generalization gap could be derived from any of the above divergences.
Theorem 4. Let M be the probabilistic mapping at hand. Let us suppose that M is dTV -(α, ) robust then:
|Riskα(M)− Risk(M)| ≤ 1− (Ex
[
e−Hc(M(x))
]
− )
where Hc is the collision entropy: Hc(p) = − log(
∑
i p
2
i )
Proof. For two discrete random independent variables of law P = (p1, ..., pK) and Q = (q1, ..., qK), thanks to
Jensen’s inequality:
P(P = Q) =
K∑
i=1
piqi =
K∑
i=1
p2i −
∑
pi(pi − qi) ≥ e−Hc(P ) − dTV (P,Q)
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because, for any i ∈ [K], pi − qi ≤ dTV (P,Q).
Then, the proof is a simple adaptation of the model of proof from Theorem 2.
D Additional empirical evaluation
Due to space limitations, we had to defer the thorough description of our experimental setup and the results of some
additional experiments.
D.1 Architectures & Hyper-parameters
We conduct experiments with 3 different dataset:
• CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets, which are composed of 50K training samples, 10000 test samples and
respectively 10 and 100 different classes. Images are trained and evaluated with a resolution of 32 by 32 pixels.
• ImageNet dataset, which is composed of ∼ 1.2M training examples, 50K test samples and 1000 classes. Images
are trained and evaluated with a resolution of 299 by 299 pixels.
For CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 [26], we used a Wide ResNet architecture [50] which is a variant of the ResNet model
from [24]. We used 28 layers with a widen factor of 10. We trained all the networks for 200 epochs, a batch size of 400,
dropout 0.3 and Leaky Relu activation with a slope on R− of 0.1. We used the cross entropy loss with Momentum 0.9
and a piecewise constant learning rate of 0.1, 0.02, 0.004 and 0.00008 after respectively 7500, 15000 and 20000 steps.
The networks achieve for CIFAR10 and 100 a TOP-1 accuracy of 95.8% and 79.1% respectively on test images.
For ImageNet [12], we used an Inception ResNet v2 [45] which is the sate of the art architecture for this dataset and
achieved a TOP-1 accuracy of 80%. For the training of ImageNet, we used the same hyper parameters setting as
the original implementation. We trained the network for 120 epochs with a batch size of 256, dropout 0.8, Relu as
activation function. All evaluations were done with a single crop on the non-blacklisted subset of the validation set.
D.2 Evaluation under attack
We evaluate our models against the strongest possible attacks from the literature using different norms (`1, `2 and `∞)
which are all optimization based attacks. On their guide to evaluate robustness, Carlini et al. [6] proposed the three
following attacks for each norm:
`2 – Carlini & Wagner attack and `1 – ElasticNet attack The `2 Carlini & Wagner attack (C&W ) introduced
in [7] is formulated as:
min
x+r∈X
c× ||r||2 + g(x+ r)
where g is a function such that g(y) ≥ 0 iff f(y) = l′ with l′ the target class. The authors listed some g functions. we
choose the following one:
g(x) = max(Fk(x)(x)− max
i6=k(x)
(Fi(x)),−κ)
where F is the softmax function and κ a positive constant.
Instead of using box-constrained L-BFGS [46] as in the original attack, the authors use instead a new variable for x+ r:
x+ r =
1
2
(tanh(w) + 1)
Then a binary search is performed to optimize the constant c and ADAM or SGD for computing an optimal solution.
`1 – ElasticNet attack is an adaptation of `2 C&W attack where the objective is adaptive to `1 perturbations:
min
x+r∈X
c1 × ‖r‖1 + c2 × ‖r‖2 + g(x+ r)
`∞ – PGD attack. The PGD attack proposed by [31] is a generalization of the iterative FGSM attack proposed
in [27]. The goal of the adversary is to solve the following problem:
argmax
‖r‖p≤
L(Fθ(x+ r), y)
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In practice, the authors proposed an iterative method to compute a solution:
xt+1 = Px⊕r(xt + α sign(∇xL(Fθ(xt), y)))
Where x⊕ r is the Minkowski sum between {x} and {r s.t. ‖r‖p ≤ }, α a gradient step size, PS is the projection
operator on S and x0 is randomly chosen in x⊕ r.
D.3 Detailed results on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100
Figure 2: (a) Impact of the standard deviation of the injected noise on accuracy in a randomized model
on CIFAR-100 dataset with a Wide ResNet architecture. (b) and (c) illustration of the guaranteed
accuracy of different randomized models with Gaussian (b) and Laplace (c) noises given the norm of
the adversarial perturbation.
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Figure 3(a) presents the trade-off accuracy versus intensity of noise for the CIFAR-100 dataset. As for CIFAR-10,
we observe that the accuracy decreases from 0.79 with a small noise (0.01) to ∼0.55 with a higher noise (0.5). The
Figures 3(b) and 3(c) are coherent with the theoretical guarantee of accuracy (Theorem 2) that the model can achieve
under attack with a given perturbation and noise.
Table 3 and 4 summarize the results on the accuracy and accuracy under attack of CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets
with a Randomized Wide ResNet architecture given the standard deviation of the injected noise and the number of
iterations of the attack. For PGD, we use an epsilon max of 0.06 and a step size of 0.006 for an input space of between
-1 and +1. We show that injecting noise empirically helps defending neural networks against adversarial attacks.
Table 3: Accuracy and Accuracy under attack of CIFAR-10 dataset
Natural
`1 – EAD `2 – C&W `∞ – PGD
20 50 60 20 50 60 10 15 20
Normal (Sd)
0.010 0.954 0.208 0.193 0.172 0.271 0.294 0.411 0.428 0.408
0.050 0.950 0.265 0.347 0.367 0.350 0.454 0.423 0.638 0.549 0.486
0.130 0.931 0.389 0.401 0.411 0.443 0.495 0.515 0.710 0.636 0.553
0.200 0.913 0.411 0.456 0.470 0.481 0.516 0.724 0.629 0.539
0.320 0.876 0.442 0.450 0.445 0.475 0.522 0.499 0.720 0.641 0.566
0.500 0.824 0.453 0.513 0.448 0.503 0.494 0.523 0.694 0.608 0.587
Laplace (Sd)
0.010 0.955 0.167 0.190 0.208 0.184 0.279 0.313 0.474 0.423 0.389
0.050 0.950 0.326 0.315 0.355 0.387 0.458 0.448 0.630 0.534 0.515
0.130 0.929 0.388 0.426 0.435 0.461 0.515 0.493 0.688 0.599 0.538
0.200 0.919 0.417 0.464 0.484 0.481 0.501 0.730 0.600 0.569
0.320 0.891 0.460 0.443 0.448 0.472 0.499 0.520 0.750 0.665 0.576
0.500 0.846 0.454 0.471 0.464 0.488 0.494 0.721 0.650 0.589
Exponential (Sd)
0.010 0.953 0.153 0.174 0.228 0.292 0.306 0.443 0.404 0.395
0.050 0.953 0.312 0.326 0.330 0.343 0.468 0.435 0.616 0.575 0.479
0.130 0.940 0.373 0.402 0.411 0.424 0.504 0.679 0.585 0.526
0.200 0.936 0.394 0.414 0.455 0.510 0.501 0.701 0.623 0.550
0.320 0.919 0.429 0.426 0.416 0.494 0.492 0.513 0.739 0.638 0.564
0.500 0.900 0.423 0.454 0.470 0.488 0.494 0.516 0.752 0.699 0.594
D.4 Large scale robustness
Adversarial training fails to generalize to higher dimensional datasets such as ImageNet. We conducted experiments
with the large scale ImageNet dataset and compared our randomized neural network against large scale adversarial
19
Table 4: Accuracy and Accuracy under attack of CIFAR-100 dataset.
Natural
`1 – EAD `2 – C&W `∞ – PGD
20 50 60 20 50 60 10 15 20
Normal (Sd)
0.010 0.790 0.235 0.234 0.228 0.235 0.318 0.316 0.257 0.176 0.187
0.050 0.768 0.321 0.294 0.320 0.357 0.377 0.410 0.377 0.296 0.254
0.130 0.726 0.357 0.371 0.349 0.387 0.427 0.428 0.414 0.319 0.260
0.200 0.689 0.338 0.350 0.384 0.394 0.381 0.439 0.356 0.277
0.320 0.627 0.334 0.344 0.350 0.328 0.364 0.400 0.441 0.366 0.299
0.500 0.553 0.322 0.331 0.331 0.349 0.342 0.351 0.408 0.374 0.308
Laplace (Sd)
0.010 0.782 0.199 0.227 0.243 0.225 0.311 0.321 0.236 0.190 0.177
0.050 0.763 0.326 0.317 0.331 0.354 0.377 0.409 0.368 0.319 0.256
0.130 0.723 0.337 0.357 0.344 0.408 0.414 0.408 0.420 0.346 0.293
0.200 0.695 0.355 0.349 0.361 0.393 0.405 0.393 0.445 0.340 0.303
0.320 0.647 0.324 0.373 0.357 0.388 0.387 0.373 0.460 0.381 0.303
0.500 0.572 0.310 0.308 0.323 0.358 0.351 0.361 0.425 0.403 0.329
Exponential (Sd)
0.010 0.785 0.218 0.251 0.217 0.247 0.278 0.321 0.250 0.214 0.169
0.050 0.767 0.323 0.337 0.317 0.346 0.380 0.402 0.356 0.291 0.235
0.130 0.749 0.330 0.356 0.403 0.444 0.421 0.400 0.328 0.266
0.200 0.731 0.345 0.361 0.357 0.388 0.424 0.406 0.427 0.340 0.267
0.320 0.703 0.349 0.351 0.340 0.388 0.439 0.399 0.433 0.351 0.280
0.500 0.673 0.387 0.378 0.378 0.396 0.435 0.485 0.370 0.322
training proposed by Kurakin et al. [27]. One can observe from Table 5 that the model from Kurakin et al. is neither
robust against recent `1 nor `2 iterative attacks such as EAD and C&W. Moreover, it offers a small robustness against
`∞ PGD attack. Our randomized neural network with EoT attacks offers a small robustness on `1 and `2 attacks while
being less robust against PGD.
Table 5: Accuracy under attack of the Adversarial model training by Kurakin et al. [27] and an
Inception Resnet v2 model training with normal 0.1 noise injected in the image on the ImageNet
dataset.
Baseline `1 EAD 60 `2 C&W 60 `∞ PGD
Kurakin et al. [27] 0.739 0.097 0.100 0.239
Normal 0.1 0.625 0.255 0.301 0.061
D.5 Experiments with noise on the first activation
The aim of the following experiments is empirically illustrate the Data processing inequality in Proposition 2.
Table 6 and 7 present the experiments conducted with the same set of parameters as the previous ones on CIFAR-10
and CIFAR-100, but with the noise injected in the first activation layer instead of directly in the image. We observe
from Table 6 that we can inject more noise with a marginal loss on accuracy. The accuracy under attack is presented in
Table 7 for a selection of models.
Table 6: Impact of the distribution and the intensity of the noise with randomized networks with noise
injected on the first activation
Sd Normal Sd Laplace Sd Exponential
0.01 0.956 0.01 0.955 0.01 0.953
0.23 0.943 0.05 0.947 0.08 0.943
0.45 0.935 0.10 0.933 0.15 0.938
0.68 0.926 0.15 0.916 0.23 0.925
0.90 0.916 0.20 0.911 0.30 0.919
1.00 0.916 0.25 0.897 0.38 0.903
1.34 0.906 0.30 0.889 0.45 0.897
1.55 0.900 0.35 0.882 0.53 0.886
1.77 0.893 0.40 0.867 0.60 0.885
2.00 0.886 0.45 0.855 0.68 0.875
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Table 7: Accuracy and Accuracy under attack of selected models with noise on the first activation
Natural
`1 – EAD `2 – C&W `∞ – PGD
20 50 60 20 50 60 10 20
Dataset Distribution Sd
CIFAR10
Normal 1.55 0.900 0.441 0.440 0.413 0.477 0.482 0.484 0.683 0.526
Laplace 0.25 0.897 0.388 0.436 0.445 0.481 0.506 0.491 0.664 0.493
Exponential 0.38 0.903 0.456 0.463 0.438 0.495 0.516 0.506 0.697 0.557
CIFAR100
Normal 0.45 0.741 0.362 0.352 0.353 0.352 0.410 0.418 0.380 0.250
Laplace 0.10 0.742 0.350 0.367 0.350 0.371 0.419 0.418 0.264
Exponential 0.15 0.741 0.354 0.356 0.373 0.394 0.409 0.420 0.430 0.258
E Additional discussions on the experiments
For the sake of completeness and reproducibility, we give some additional insights on the noise injection scheme and
comprehensive details on our numerical experiments.
E.1 On the need for injecting noise in the training phase
Robustness has always been thought as a property to be enforced at inference time and it is tempting to focus only on
injecting noise at inference. However, simply doing so ruins the accuracy of the algorithm (as it becomes an instance
of distribution shift [44]). Indeed, making the assumption that the training and test distributions matches, in practice,
injecting some noise at inference would result in changing the test distribution.
Distribution shift occurs when the training distribution differs from the test distribution. This implies that the hypothesis
minimizing the empirical risk is not consistent, i.e. it does not converge to the true model as the training size increases.
A way to circumvent that is to ensure that training and test distributions matches using importance weighting (in the
case of covariate-shift) or with noise injection in the training phases as well (in our case).
E.2 Reproducibility of the experiments
We emphasize that all experiments should be easily reproducible. All our experiments are developed with TensorFlow
version 1.12 [1]. The code is available as supplemental material and will be open sourced upon acceptance of the paper.
The archive contains a readme file containing a small documentation on how to run the experiments, a configuration
file which defines the architecture and the hyper-parameters of the experiments, python scripts which generate a bash
command to run the experiments. The code contains Randomized Wide Resnet used for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR100,
Inception Resnet v2 used for ImageNet, PGD, EAD and C&W attacks used for evaluation under attack. We ran our
experiments, on a cluster with computers each having 8 GPU Nvidia V100.
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